Ramos, Robert
Ransom, Wilton
Redfield, Richard M.
Rivera, Erwin
Ross, Pete A.
Royse, Lynda R.
Rupkalvis, Gregory M.
Ryan, Thomas J.
Scott, Stanley
Scuteri, Michael F.
Shepard, Jason K.
Simpson, Jeffrey S.
Smith, Robert S.
Snodgrass, William J. Jr.
Stehle, Brian C.
Stewart, Donald G.
Stiner, Mark T.
Stone, Jeffery C.
Stringer, David B.
Sublett, Charles E.
Talbot, Mark E.
Terry, Ingrid M.
Varnadore, Marcus L.
Wallace, Eugene F.
Warnick, David A.
Washington, Crystal M.
Webber, David E.
Zachary, Bernard Jr.

* Denotes below the zone

WORTH READING

Command in War

Martin van Creveld
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1985

Reviewed by Geoffrey French, a Counterintelligence Analyst with General Dynamics and former Logistics Specialist for the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.

The role of the commander in war is paramount, yet there is no military in the world that has reduced command to a science, knowing what to do and say at critical times. Many books have been written on the intangible qualities for leadership and vision, and others have looked at the qualities of great military commanders from history. Modern military leadership, however, is not built around personalities — it is built on systems of command. Martin van Creveld — a military historian who has long been a resource for the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force — examines command structure and staff development in *Command in War*.

As in any military history survey, *Command in War* breaks down events into coherent time periods. Whereas van Creveld used four categories to describe the effects technology has had on war, he uses more to describe the evolution of command. The first, referred to as the "Stone Age of Command," is the era where the commander was present with his troops, fighting with them and exercising tactical control over a relatively small number of men in a small geographic area. The second era was ushered in by Napoleon, and van Creveld devotes a chapter entirely to him, because the revolutionary aspect of Napoleonic warfare is directly related to command — not technology. This is remarkable in and of itself. Napoleon developed the system of command idea where independent corps were given general orders and operated for significant time periods without orders. This system, and Napoleon's genius, gave the French armies an enormous advantage over their enemies, with no superiority in weapons, transportation or communications.

Van Creveld then moves to the formalization of the general staff in Prussia. Prussian changes to Napoleon's idea improved the structure and consistency of staff command and further decentralized control to the lower-level commanders. Command now took place from the rear, but retained flexibility in the field. Although many nations copied this concept, all — including the Germans — drew incorrect lessons, viewing war and battle as the careful unfolding of meticulous plans, as exemplified in World War I. Obviously, staffs (and plans) created under this concept failed when faced with the uncertainty inherent in war.

The following chapter deals with mobile warfare, where van Creveld briefly discusses models from World War II that allowed junior officers great independence and freedom to address tactical needs innovatively. In more detail, he discusses 1967 and 1973 Israeli Defense Forces operations, juxtaposing the flexibility of the command system in the former with the rigidity in the latter. In this chapter, and in the final one that looks at the U.S. command system employed in Vietnam from 1963 to 1968, van Creveld looks at two modern systems that stifled initiative and centralized control, with poor effects. In both cases, the choice at the highest level to retain control was reflected in the lower levels as well, leading to a system where decisions were made without the proper information and where coordination was difficult at best.

Like all of van Creveld's works, *Command in War* is well-structured. In each chapter, he discusses the political and technological developments that brought about change and the command structures of the period. Although the author touches on many systems to provide examples and illustrate points, he focuses on one system and one significant campaign that typifies each period. Finally, he reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the systems and compares them to others.

Van Creveld gives the reader a thorough, but concise, examination of the historical trends in command, tracing the balance of centralization and decentralization through time. As with other books he has written, van Creveld avoids generalizations and impressions about a battle or an era and instead works with facts, from which he pulls conclusions. And as with his other books, van Creveld delivers a work that is both profound and easily understood.

Blood & Oil: Inside the Shah's Iran

Manucher Farmanfarmaian and Roxane Farmanfarmaian
Random House Inc., New York, 1997

Reviewed by Joe Sites, Executive Vice President of BRTRC Inc., Fairfax, VA.

On the inside jacket of *Blood & Oil*, is this comment on the book by Fouad Ajami, Director of Middle East Studies, Johns Hopkins University: "A luminous memoir of Iran before the deluge, a book of stunning beauty about an irretrievably lost world. One of the best accounts of the cultural and political life of modern Iran, it is exquisite and intimate rendered with artistry and detail." It would be difficult to surpass this appraisal of *Blood & Oil*, but it is important to cite some specifics.

As stated in the book title, the author, whose daughter is co-author, was a member of the Persian royal family. The author and his family members held the highest governmental and industrial (petroleum) positions within Persia (now Iran). When the author was a young boy, his father had eight wives. Each wife had her own house in a rather large compound, and each wife had many children. With this number of brothers and sisters and numerous uncles on both sides of his family, the reports of both good and bad encounters with relatives were very believable. The book's use of the word "blood" refers to both the supportive and sometimes not so supportive ties of relatives as well as the significance of being part of a large family with great political and cultural influence. At times, the author's family was in favor with the government. At other critical times, the family was not. Because of his family's changing views, the author's memoirs include many ups and downs related directly to his blood relatives. These incidents included granting favors, awarding positions of power, removal from positions of power, punishments, assistance in escaping punishment and, finally, expatriation. The significance of the "blood" portion of the title is simply that political power and the Persian culture rested highly on family, tribes and religion. The author's version of how the Shah of Iran obtained power, maintained his position and finally lost power is based on how the Shah treated his nation's many different factions. One item of special interest was the author's opinion that the Shah did not show sufficient respect for key local leaders.

This book gives an extremely interesting version of the rise of oil's importance in the world economy, the development of oil fields in the Middle East and the creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The author states that the real turning point in oil's importance was the British Admiralty's decision to convert their coal-burning ships to oil-burning ships. This decision involved evaluating factors such as relative efficiency of propulsion systems, remaining competitive with foreign navies, conversion costs and, of most importance to subsequent history, source of oil supplies. British exploration and discovery of oil in Persia created the necessity for the British to cultivate support within Persia. The British exerted decades-long influence on the Persian government to develop oil agreements, which led to the British Petroleum Co. The author states that because oil production was controlled in most nations by foreign interests, the producing countries did not receive a fair share of the revenue. This arrangement began to change when U.S. companies began offering higher shares to Venezuela. Through his contacts in Venezuela, the author was able to assist in conducting meetings, which eventually resulted in OPEC's establishment. The author instructs how oil was produced, worker conditions and how negotiations were conducted. All of this provides good insight into relations between oil-producing nations and OPEC patrons.

Blood & Oil provides an unusual perspective of the importance of family and family groupings in the Middle East's struggle to achieve and maintain power. Because this perspective is from the eyes of a Persian with historical family roots, the customs and rituals that seem strange to Western eyes are seen as a way of doing business. There is no apology for using family influence — that is just the way it works. As for the oil portion, the author provides firsthand reporting, again from the perspective of a Middle Eastern executive, on the relations between the Middle East and the rest of the world.

Blood & Oil relates many good stories that apply to our understanding of the Middle East. One of the nagging questions for the reader is: If the British Admiralty had foreseen

the current problems in the Middle East, would they have converted from coal-burning ships much later? A lesson for today's reader is that there can be far-reaching and unknown effects from the introduction of new technology in developing nations and world regions.

NEWS BRIEFS

Army Fields New 80-Passenger "Troop Hauler"

A new Army system for transporting soldiers to and from training sites was developed and placed in the field last year. The new system, called the "Troop Hauler," is replacing the outdated vehicles formerly used to transport troops to training sites.

Development of the new transportation system was a coordinated effort by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) and the General Services Administration. The system, a nontactical vehicle, is managed by TACOM's Materiel Support Group. Lifeline Shelter Systems of Columbus, OH, built the vehicles.

The system consists of an 80-passenger semitrailer van and a truck tractor. The unit has rucksack storage space, air conditioning and heating, a two-way communication system between the truck driver and the drill instructor in the van, egress windows, interior lighting, escape hatches in the roof and several other key safety features.

When developing the new transportation system, both safety and durability were priorities. Safe troop movement was a top priority as well as a necessity. The new system will eliminate using outdated vehicles or commercial buses that are not really suited for moving troops and their equipment. In the past, transporting 80 troops would have required using two 44-passenger buses. Some of the troop haulers are now being used 24/7 to more safely and economically move troops from one site to another.

New troop haulers were fielded at Fort Leonard Wood, MO; Fort Sill, OK; and Fort Benning, GA. Fort Leonard Wood received the prototype model in June 2001. Since then, and after a few modifications, 10 additional units were fielded. The feedback regarding troop-hauler performance is that it outperforms anything previously used to transport troops. System performance on rough installation roads or on highways at top speeds of 65 mph has been effective and problem-free.

The Army plans to procure and field additional units in FY04.

The preceding article was submitted by Rosalie Velthoven, a Materiel Support Group member who is a Level III certified Weapon System Manager.

Heaping on Heat

Heating tents safely, effectively and efficiently is now much simpler thanks to the Family of Space Heaters (FOSH) developed by Product Manager Force Sustainment Systems located at the U.S. Army Soldier Systems Center, Natick, MA.

FOSH uses the latest advances in combustion, power-generation and microprocessor technology to provide comfort and protection for soldiers, supplies and equipment in tents during field cold-weather operations. It replaces the old World War II-era M-1941 "pot belly" and M-1950 "Yukon" heaters and eliminates the serious operational deficiencies and safety hazards associated with these antiquated systems.

While many seemingly attractive commercial space heaters are available in today's marketplace, they are unacceptable from a safety, performance and economic perspective. Military units are urged to replace their stock of these heaters with standard vented military heaters. Commercial unvented kerosene or propane-fueled heaters that release exhaust directly into the living space present a serious risk of injury or death to soldiers and should never be used.